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invoked for the USA and EU), no nation 
had legislation requiring the pharma-
ceutical industry (which is often the 
ﬁ rst to know) to inform the relevant 
medicines regulatory authority (MRA) 
of drug falsiﬁ cation. It is extraordinary 
that, in 2014, such systems are widely 
in place for suspicious aircraft parts but 
not for suspicious medicines.8 WHO’s 
new Rapid Alert System facilitates 
information sharing on poor-quality 
medicines between medicines 
regulatory authorities (MRAs).5 It 
should be mandatory and included in 
the International Health Regulations.1 
When pharma ceutical companies 
and others encounter suspicious 
medicines or medical products, there 
remains tension between commercial 
interests, the need to investigate, 
and the requirement to act quickly to 
safeguard public health. There is no 
consensus mechanism to adjudicate 
these decisions from a public health 
perspective. This stagnant system 
must change. All reports of suspect 
medicines known to the pharma-
ceutical industry and others should 
be reported to the WHO and MRA 
within 1 week for investigation, risk 
assessment, and appropriate dis-
semination. If those reporting wish 
delayed onward dissemination, an 
advisory committee of MRAs and 
WHO with independent advice should 
perform a rapid public health risk 
assessment. Compliance should be 
reported through a mechanism such as 
the Access to Medicine Index.
Falsiﬁ ed medicines in 
Africa: all talk, no action
 Poor-quality medicines and medical 
products, both substandard and 
falsified, cause avoidable morbidity, 
mortality, drug resistance, and loss 
of faith in health systems, especially 
in low-income and middle-income 
countries.1–3 We report the analysis of 
two falsiﬁ ed medicines from Angola 
and discuss what lessons such a 
discovery could hold.
The tablets were seized at Luanda 
docks in June, 2012, after failing 
Minilab testing.4,5 The seized shipment 
was enormous (1·4 million packets), 
and hidden in loudspeakers in a 
container from China.4 One sample 
was labelled as an adult course of the 
vital antimalarial drug artemether-
lumefantrine, and as being manu-
factured by “Novartis Pharma ceutical 
Corpor ation”; it also bore an Aﬀ ordable 
Medicines Facility—malaria logo 
(ﬁ gure). Another sample was labelled 
as the broad-spectrum anthelmintic 
mebend azole,  and as being 
manufactured by “Janssen-Cilag SpA”.
We analysed the tablets with an 
array of analytical platforms, including 
high-performance liquid chromato-
graphy, ambient ionisation mass 
spectrometry, Raman spectroscopy, 
Xray powder diﬀ raction (XRD) analysis, 
nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy, 
isotope-ratio mass spectrometry (IRMS), 
and botanical assays. Packaging was 
analysed with the portable counterfeit 
detection device CD-3 (see appendix 
for detailed methods).
No artemether, lumefantrine, 
or other active pharmaceutical 
ingredients were detected in the 
“artemether-lumefantrine” tablets by 
any of the chemical assay techniques. 
Brushite and three different yellow 
dyes (pigment yellow 3, pigment 
yellow 81, and pigment yellow 151) 
were detected. No mebendazole was 
detected in the “mebendazole” tablets, 
but the active ingredient levamisole 
(270 mg/tablet) was. XRD analysis 
revealed the presence of calcite 
(CaCO3), with IRMS data suggesting 
that it was either hydrothermal or 
medical in origin. The CD-3 ultraviolet-
visible and infrared images of the 
falsified and genuine packaging 
readily showed substantial diﬀ erences 
between them. Language errors on 
the “mebendazole” packages were 
common, suggesting that the forger 
may have had some knowledge of 
English but little of French and Spanish.
Falsified artemether-lumefantrine 
has also been described across central 
and west Africa.5 Such products will 
inevitably cause increased morbidity, 
mortality, and transmission, and 
could falsely indicate that artemisinin 
resistance had arrived. Additionally, 
modelling strongly suggests that under-
dosing is an important contributor 
to resistance.6 Therefore, if patients 
consume co-circulating falsified and 
substandard medicines sequentially, so 
that heavy parasite burdens encounter 
low drug concentrations, the risks of 
engendering resistance are high.
The presence of the anthelmintic 
levamisole is also worrying because 
it has been withdrawn from many 
markets for human use owing to its 
association with agranulocytosis. The 
recent epidemic of necrotising vasculitis 
resulting from “cutting” cocaine with 
levamisole7 suggests links between 
criminals who produce narcotics and 
those who produce falsiﬁ ed medicines.
These examples illustrate the major 
obstacles to improving the global 
medicine supply. First, there is no global 
system for the mandatory reporting, 
assessment, and dis semination of 
information on suspicious medicines. 
The seizure in Angola was ﬁ rst brought 
to public attention on Facebook after 
5 months, and in the printed press after 
11 months.4 It was Facebook who ﬁ rst 
alerted those responsible for malaria 
control liaison at WHO. Although 
such reporting is commendable, it is 
grossly inadequate for tropical public 
health what proportion of African 
malaria patients and their families 
reads Facebook and the Wall Street 
Journal? Until 2011–12 (when it was 
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7% of sub-Saharan countries had a 
“moderately functioning MRA”.10 We 
cannot expect the world’s medicine 
supply to improve without co ordinated 
functional MRAs. They are essential 
for the interventions needed, and to 
ensure that the beneﬁ ts of increased 
accessibility to free or inexpensive 
internationally ﬁ nanced medicines and 
inexpensive generics are translated 
eﬀ ectively into improved public health. 
The Access to Medicines movement 
has been very important in improving 
access to essential medicines; however, 
much more emphasis is needed now 
on access to good quality medicines.
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Second, recent inaction regarding 
medicine quality has involved disputes 
over definitions from a trade and 
political perspective. These disputes 
must have damaged public health. The 
acronym NATO (no action—talk only), 
sadly reﬂ ects recent history. Extended 
discussion at World Health Assemblies 
culminated in 2011 with the formation 
of a Member State mechanism. 
However, chairmanship disagreements 
then apparently delayed discussion 
for 6 months.9 The group now has 
meetings just once per year. 
The terminology remains confused—
for example, a recent US Institute of 
Medicine report on medicine quality2 
did not state clearly what term should 
be used for medicines that are poor 
quality but not falsiﬁ ed. Here we have 
used the distinction between falsiﬁ ed 
(or counterfeit or spurious medicines—
ie, those deliberately and fraudulently 
mislabelled with respect to identity or 
source) and substandard medicines 
(ie, genuine medicines produced by 
authorised manufacturers that do 
not meet quality speciﬁ cations set for 
them by national standards).3 To avoid 
any intellectual property connotations, 
the term falsiﬁ ed is used here instead 
of counterfeit.3 We believe that this is 
the clearest way forward.
Third, the extradition and pros-
ecution of criminals, such as those 
trading in falsiﬁ ed medicines between 
China and Angola, is extremely 
difficult as falsification of medicine 
or medical products is not an inter-
national crime, and definitions and 
laws are inconsistent. An international 
public health convention could assist 
in combating criminal networks and 
provide a ﬁ nancing mechanism for MRA 
and factory support (ie, detecting and 
reducing factory errors or negligence).3 
The Insitute of Medicine favours soft-
law solutions,2 but the lack of legally 
binding force would neuter action.
Fourth, the enormous investment 
in accessible medicines and medical 
products without investment in 
checking their quality is profoundly 
illogical. WHO estimates that only 
